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A B S T R AC T  | For decades Latin American societies and policy-makers have attempted to confront the social, 
political and economic challenges brought about by high levels of informal employment and entrepreneurial 
activity. Social exclusion, low rates of political participation, dysfunctional social protection schemes and 
mistrust of the law are some of the social phenomena that are inextricably linked to informality. This research 
article takes a socio-legal approach to explore linkages between informal employment, social protection and 
labour law proposing that purely economic or legal approaches overlook crucial contextual issues that hinder 
the formulation of sound regulatory policies. Thus this paper develops an analytical perspective based on the 
social rights and citizenship discourse questioning current social policies and the role of labour law.
K E Y WO R D S  | Informal employment, citizenship, social protection, labour law, social rights, socio-legal studies.
Una exploración socio-jurídica de los nexos entre el empleo informal, la protección social y el derecho 
laboral en América Latina
RESUMEN | Durante décadas, las sociedades latinoamericanas y los decisores de política han intentado hacer 
frente a los retos sociales, políticos y económicos provocados por los altos niveles de empleo informal y la actividad 
empresarial. La exclusión social, las bajas tasas de participación política, los esquemas de protección social disfun-
cionales y la desconfianza de la ley son algunos de los fenómenos sociales que están inextricablemente ligados a la 
informalidad. Este artículo de investigación parte de un enfoque socio-jurídico para explorar los vínculos entre el 
empleo informal, la protección social y la legislación laboral al proponer que aproximaciones puramente econó-
micas o jurídicas ignoran problemáticas cruciales coyunturales que limitan la formulación de políticas regulatorias 
apropiadas. Así, esta investigación desarrolla una perspectiva analítica basada en el discurso de derechos sociales y 
ciudadanía que cuestiona las políticas sociales actuales y el papel de la legislación laboral.
PA L A B R A S  C L AV E  | Empleo informal, ciudadanía, protección social, derecho laboral, derechos sociales, estudios 
socio-jurídicos.
Uma exploração sociojurídica dos nexos entre o emprego informal, a proteção social e o direito trabalhista 
na América Latina
R E S U M O  | Durante décadas, as sociedades latino-americanas e os que tomam as decisões políticas têm tentado 
enfrentar os desafios sociais, políticos e econômicos provocados pelos altos níveis de emprego informal e pela 
atividade empresarial. A exclusão social, as baixas taxas de participação política, os esquemas de proteção 
social disfuncionais e a desconfiança da lei são alguns dos fenômenos sociais que estão inextricavelmente 
ligados à informalidade. Este artigo de pesquisa parte de um enfoque sociojurídico para explorar os vínculos 
entre o emprego informal, a proteção social e a legislação trabalhista ao propor que aproximações puramente 
econômicas ou jurídicas ignoram problemáticas cruciais conjunturais que limitam a formulação de políticas 
regulatórias apropriadas. Assim, esta pesquisa desenvolve uma perspectiva analítica baseada no discurso de 
direitos sociais e cidadania que questiona as políticas sociais atuais e o papel da legislação trabalhista.
PA L AV R A S - C H AV E  | Emprego informal, cidadania, proteção social, direito trabalhista, direitos sociais, estudos 
sociojurídicos.
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Introduction
This article highlights the socio-political struggles 
that have sought to translate de jure rights claims into 
actionable social and labour legislation that de facto 
protects and empowers citizens, calling for a compre-
hensive regulatory approach to the informal employment 
sector in order to elucidate the function of law’s operation 
in society, and the limits of legislative action. This 
research claims that the informal employment sector is 
a promising and fitting analytical prism though which to 
study the evolution, objectives, and conflicts of social and 
labour regulation in Latin America over time.
Although Latin American governments have employed 
law as a regulatory device in order to convey the 
progressive rhetoric of rights and citizenship, 
social reality has generally been very different from 
this throughout history. To a considerable degree, 
regulatory intervention in social protection and labour 
law has proved ineffective in protecting workers, 
empowering citizens, and nurturing businesses. 
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that law and 
regulation serve as a control and steering device for 
developmental processes, provided that they become 
embedded in inclusive and accountable socio-economic 
and political institutions over time.
For decades informal employment has been among 
the most persistent and pressing features challenging 
the development of participatory social and political 
institutions in Latin America. The fervent pursuit of 
specific economic development strategies coupled with 
a belief in top-down regulatory policy prescriptions has 
little bearing on a complex societal problem that will 
not simply fade away as a result of economic growth. 
The quality of citizenship and citizens’ opportunities to 
engage in participatory action hold the key to resolving 
a problem that is both a cause and a consequence of 
exclusion and inequality.
This article places the analysis of informal employment 
activities among workers and firms at the intersection of 
the conceptual dimensions of regulation and rights, focusing 
particularly on the cases of Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. 
The labour market serves as the central locus in which to 
examine not only economic facets of development, but 
also the social and political forces that shape society’s 
struggle for just and efficient resource allocation, as well 
as for protective and empowering policies. What is more, 
inequality and exclusion within the labour market are 
both symptoms and results of political power asymme-
tries within society. Furthermore, the persistence of 
barriers to participation in formal employment activities, 
which provide income and insurance against life risks, 
ignores the skills and capacities of the most deprived 
sectors of society. That process tends to undermine the 
formation of democratic political structures that aim to 
advance citizenship rights and economic opportunities.
This article is divided into five parts. These introductory 
remarks are followed by a second section, which 
establishes the context for the themes developed in 
the remainder of the paper, placing the issues of social 
protection and labour law on the broader canvas of 
social citizenship and democracy within a market-based 
economic system of societal organization. The third section 
explores the rationale for approaching the social question 
in capitalist societies via public, universal social protection. 
The aim is to explain the purpose of social protection and 
labour law, as well as their functional aspects with respect 
to the informal employment sector in Latin America. The 
fourth section conceptualizes social protection and labour 
law within their societal context rather than as separate 
analytical entities. The fifth and final section offers some 
concluding remarks.
Social Citizenship and Democracy
Numerous attempts to regulate Latin American labour 
markets and social protection systems have so far not 
resulted in a meaningful reduction of inequality on the 
one hand, and an increase in formal employment on 
the other hand. Latin America has a long track record 
of social and labour legislation covering certain select 
sectors of the populace. Yet analysts have frequently 
exposed social and labour market policies that fall 
short of “incorporating social rights in the status of 
citizenship and thus creating a universal right to real 
income which is not proportionate to the market value 
of the claimant” (Marshall 1992, 185). In other words, 
the notion of the universality of rights, and in particular 
that of social rights, in the sense of “enforceable claims” 
(Tilly 1995, 6), has been more cosmetic rather than real 
throughout much of Latin America’s history, although 
this state of affairs has undergone significant changes 
over the past three decades.
Thus the Latin American experience bolsters the claim 
that “there is no simple and universal logic to citizenship 
in the 20th century” (Yashar 2011, 185), so that Marshall’s 
(1992) taxonomy is instructive to policy-makers but not 
necessarily observable in societies around the world. 
However, at the same time, the empirical evidence 
available on Europe suggests that, like most instances 
of social change, the process of social inclusion is 
long-term and incremental. Luhmann aptly captures 
the core of the process by stating that the “welfare 
state is the realization of political inclusion” (Luhmann 
1990, 35). However, on many occasions persons 
“without regular work […] who do not meet [a function 
system’s] requirements” are excluded (Luhmann 1997, 
70). Informal employment takes on an exclusionary 
effect due to inadequate social security coverage and 
low job quality (Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2004, 
334). That particular reading of modern society raises 
interesting questions regarding the regulation of 
informal employment in developing countries.
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In the context of economic development, the notion 
of the welfare state evolves from “[reacting] to the 
effects of industrialisation with measures of social help” 
towards “[meaning] more than just social help and more 
than just compensation for injuries” (Luhmann 1990, 21). 
In a nutshell, even though the idea of public social and 
labour policy propagates the inclusion of all members 
of society, some individuals are excluded due to their 
labour market status, which again tends to be the ramifi-
cation of prior exclusion on the grounds of education, 
class, race or gender. Furthermore, advances in industry, 
politics and society require regulators to think beyond 
the rather passive notion of a safety net and towards 
active policies of empowerment and protection.
Societies that have already consolidated relatively high 
degrees of social inclusion face fewer obstacles during 
the implementation stage of a new policy or a novel 
piece of regulation due to substantial levels of trust and 
legitimacy. Thus, the social fabric and the social capital 
of a society are decisive factors in bringing about lasting 
regulatory change. However, measuring inclusion and 
the quality of the social fabric can hardly be done with 
numbers alone. In other words, this research is not 
so much interested in the number-crunching game of 
analysing economic indicators and counting the pieces 
of legislation passed successfully, but rather more 
in the motivations for and ramifications of shifting 
patterns of social and labour regulation.
Focussing solely on a critique of regulation as a cure for 
the woes of Latin American labour markets would be 
too narrow an approach to derive analytical insights 
into the reasons for the continuous presence of high 
levels of informal employment on the one hand, and 
policy prescriptions for possible counter-measures 
on the other hand. Instead, what has become more 
pronounced is the notion that apart from law and 
regulation, numerous other factors such as entrenched 
inequality, access to the legal system and bank credit, 
democratization, state capacity, housing, education, 
and global macroeconomic factors decisively influence 
socio-economic development in general terms and the 
informal employment sector in particular.
Of course, almost all the individual factors mentioned 
above tend currently to fall under some kind of 
regulatory regime as well, so that policy-makers 
would be well advised to conceive of social and labour 
regulation as either covering a broader remit of 
regulatory areas, or as a field of regulation that could 
produce mutually beneficial outcomes by collaborating 
more closely with regulatory areas such as education, 
housing or credit.
The combined forces of economic and political history, 
as well as the increasing integration of national 
economies into global markets, confront Latin 
American countries with a number of social justice 
challenges. The term “social justice” is understood here 
as the “basic institutions of society [having to] suffi-
ciently benefit all, including the least advantaged and 
most vulnerable members of society” (Brennan 2012). 
The contested issues of social legislation, labour law 
and labour market regulation are among a range of 
common obstacles on the road towards more equitable 
and economically dynamic societies.
The labour market is of fundamental importance 
for linking society and the economy since it acts as a 
mechanism that allocates “the sweet or bitter fruits 
of economic development […] among the population” 
(Pérez 2005, 205). A labour market that is capable of 
improving the quality of “employment opportunities 
for the poor” is key to transforming economic growth 
into declining rates of poverty (Gutierrez et al. 2009, 
15). Moreover, labour markets have been central to 
the process of “social integration” in Latin America, 
in the sense that dysfunctional labour markets have 
a correspondingly dismal effect on social cohesion 
(Bayón, Roberts and Saraví 1999, 104).
Put differently, “[p]overty and equity outcomes are 
largely determined by” an economic environment and 
a regulatory framework enabling labour markets to 
create formal jobs rapidly, particularly as an economy 
adapts and emerges from a prior contraction (Tokman 
2002, 159). As an adequate measure of the impact of 
labour law and labour market regulation, one can 
assess the progress made in terms of contributing to 
labour market outcomes that protect and empower 
workers whilst also creating decent employment, 
or “economic growth [...] compatible with human 
development” (Deakin 2011, 157). Yet, on precisely the 
two issues of worker protection and the creation of 
decent employment, Latin American labour markets 
have not scored high.
In order to be effective in driving economic growth, 
redistributing wealth and contributing to a set of policies 
geared to the lower social strata, labour regulation 
needs to be simultaneously oriented along the lines of 
equity and efficiency, and it is hence important to focus 
on dimensions of labour market regulation beyond 
the employment relationship. It is helpful, therefore, 
to analyse current social policy, i.e. policy in the wake 
of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and the 
heyday of neoliberalism in the region, against the 
background of the thought most prominently expressed 
in the seminal publication “The Great Transformation” 
(Polanyi 2001). According to Polanyi’s analysis, it was 
impossible to construct a solid and fair “social order” in 
a market-based society, for it established strains, which 
unavoidably drove “individuals [to request safeguards] 
from the market’s destructive power because market 
society sought to reduce humans to […] commodities” 
(Silva 2009, 17). Against this background, it is worth 
bearing in mind that the Philadelphia Declaration of the 
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International Labour Organisation (ILO) also explicitly 
warns against the latter point as an outcome that said 
organisation has sought to avoid ever since (ILO 1944). 
According to Kuchler, Bourdieu’s more contemporary 
perspective seems closely aligned to Polanyi’s, as 
the French sociologist views the welfare state as an 
“achievement that protects society from run-away 
capitalism” (Kuchler 2006, 7, my translation).
Moreover, Silva argues that demoting people “to (ficti-
tious) commodities disrupts [their] economic stability, 
[and] sense of justice, [so that] people inevitably seek 
[insurance] from the […] unpredictable […] market” (Silva 
2009, 17). In this context Polanyi states that the three 
commodities —land, labour and money— could not in 
reality be translated into tradeable goods “as they were 
not produced for sale on the market,” thus leading 
Polanyi to label them “fictitious commodities” (Polanyi 
2001, 79). What is more, Polanyi inserts another vital 
clarification into debates on labour, claiming, “labour 
is the technical term used for human beings, insofar as 
they are not employers but employed” (Polanyi 2001, 79).
Silva’s 2009 summary of key concepts of Polanyi’s 
work in the above paragraph is, of course, reminiscent 
of the ideas on citizenship put forward by T. H. 
Marshall (1963 and 1992). In regulatory parlance, 
Polanyi’s thought lays bare the tensions between 
private and public theories of regulation, and shifts 
the analytical focus towards the notion of the public 
interest. Polanyi’s arguments “extend beyond, and [are] 
antithetical to the practices, values, and outcomes of 
market-driven decision-making” (Feintuck 2010, 39). 
In an attempt not only to reconcile warring compet-
itive and protective themes, but also to provide an 
analytical roadmap, the institutionalist regulatory 
paradigm maintains that the markets for labour and 
commodities “are conscious institutional constructs 
rooted in historical trajectories and based on evolving 
political choices” (Chaudhry 1993, 249).
Furthermore, the signalling mechanism that prices 
fulfil in the markets for actual and real commodities 
rather than “fictitious commodities” leads to the 
“rapid balancing of supply and demand,” and the price 
mechanism is alien to the market for labour in “which 
supply and demand are balanced” more slowly (Block 
2005, 8). In more general terms, prices take on the role 
of languages within the setting of the market, “enabling 
people to form mutual expectations” (Schmidtz 2012). 
If applied to the labour market, the concept of volatile 
prices would undermine “societies that sustain stable 
identities and identifications” (Streeck 2008, 5). Some 
elements of stability have, of course, already become 
embedded in society over time, but further societal 
stability has been sought throughout contemporary 
Latin America following the demise of ISI, the hardship 
of the debt crisis, and subsequent experimentation 
with neoliberal policies.
Thus the call for the “socially, politically and ideationally 
[embedded nature of markets]” (Block 2005, 8) singles 
out the labour market as a more natural and urgent 
field of societal intervention and protection than is 
the case with other markets which governments have 
historically regulated, such as the telecommunications 
or energy markets, for example. Within this context, 
Olin Wright (2005) suggests the introduction of an 
unconditional basic income. Key regulatory aims are to 
contain or to embed markets and to provide stability, 
so that markets are agreeable and accommodating to 
individuals acting within them. Moreover, we learn 
from Filgueira and Filgueira that protection intended 
to shelter individuals against market energies is either 
“based on the market (individual capitalization), the 
state (welfare regimes), or on civil society (pre-capi-
talist protection)” (Filgueira and Filgueira 2002, 128). As 
those are ideal types of protection structures identified 
for the purposes of analysis, one can presume that in 
reality the manifestations of each individual category 
impact a society’s protective regime with different 
degrees of volatility over time.
Furthermore, a changing global political order in a 
post-Cold War world, the introduction of new constitu-
tional frameworks in countries such as Brazil (1988) and 
Colombia (1991) that broadened access to justice, and an 
increasingly deep-seated awareness of the importance 
of social rights, firstly as an input factor, secondly as an 
accompanying theme, and thirdly as a consequence of 
democratization, both motivate and necessitate novel 
approaches to social policy-making. Parker under-
stands access to justice as advancing “more substantive 
[legal] reforms [ensuring] the interests of the poor 
[and] diffuse public interests can […] overcome the 
discrepancy between the claims of substantive justice 
and the formal legal system” (Parker 1999, 31).
Integrating the process of Latin America’s post-1980s 
“Third Wave” of democratization into the analytical 
framework offers additional insights into social policy-
making and labour market institutions (Huntington 
1991 and 1997, 11). “Political competition and partici-
pation” as driving forces behind democratization not 
only positively impact the development of political 
institutions, but also result in improved labour market 
outcomes (Rodrik 1999, 707). More specifically, the 
case of Mexico illustrates that the “political context 
in which labour markets operate shapes [participants’] 
behaviour,” so that the democratic nature of political 
institutions joins the oft-mentioned economic insti-
tution of labour productivity as an explanatory factor 
for wage increases (Rodrik 1999, 708).
Western European experience demonstrates that over 
time the competitive politics of liberal democracies 
lead to higher demands for welfare and social justice 
with corresponding pressures on public finances, public 
borrowing and levels of taxation on the one hand, and 
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more equitable societies on the other hand. According 
to Whitehead, a citizenry with access to universal 
suffrage “can exercise some leverage over public policy 
priorities [and revise] goals of democratic development” 
(Whitehead 2004, 107-108).
However, Gerring, Thacker and Alfaro caution that 
the dynamics of Western European democratic and 
welfare development do not tend to unfold in a similar 
fashion outside of the western world (2012, 1-2). 
Consequently, said authors not only claim that “the 
case for democracy as a welfare-enhancing mechanism 
appears shaky,” but also that civil society, democracy 
and welfare-state institutions undergo unstable 
development requiring a long-term perspective in 
order to yield political and social “dividends” (2012, 
2-4 and 15). It has been suggested that the process of 
acculturating the elites towards “[accepting] a relative 
loss of social and political authority” features as one of 
the key challenges confronting nascent democracies 
(Grugel 2007a, 45). Furthermore, reforms and increased 
spending on primary, secondary and tertiary education 
probably require as much as a whole generation to bear 
fruit in terms of equipping citizens with literacy skills 
and technical training, so that they can more actively 
engage in and contribute to democratic and socio-
economic development (Tenjo 2012).
On a related matter, Santiso and Zoido argue that 
political pressures and the design structure of a 
democratic polity place “fiscal policy at the heart of the 
relationship between citizens and the state,” so that 
the contributory system of Latin American countries 
that fund social policies appears as a promising area 
of analysis (Santiso and Zoido 2011, 309). In fact, a 
study of Latin America by Nieto and Santiso covering 
the period between 1990 and 2006 reveals that “the 
impact of elections on fiscal policy is high” and more 
significant than in high-income countries in terms of 
increased short-term expenditure for electoral gain 
(Nieto and Santiso 2012, 566 y 580). With respect to 
the development of democratization and social policy 
in southern Europe, Ferrera notes that the stability of 
democracy is enhanced by universal social protection, 
which buttresses “citizens’ loyalty to national insti-
tutions [and ensures their] allegiance through the 
provision of material advantages” (Ferrera 2007, 95).
Furthermore, Turner and Martz argue that during the 
consolidation of democratic institutions, “the level of 
confidence that citizens have in the institutions of their 
nations” is central (1997, 65). Nevertheless, whereas 
Spain and Portugal democratized during the 1970s 
in a geopolitical environment hospitable to coupling 
political change with increased social budgets, Latin 
American paths to democracy were, by and large, 
strewn with the necessity to limit budgetary demands 
during times of “economic crisis and neo-liberal state 
reform” (Grugel 2007b, 248).
In this context it is crucial to point out that Latin 
America’s history of social reform has experienced 
frequent instances of piecemeal rather than universal 
implementation of protective schemes, which goes some 
way to explaining the divergence between Ferrara’s 
(2007) observation on Europe and Latin America’s social 
reality. Moreover, similar to the evolution of citizenship 
rights, democracy in Latin America “followed an 
unusual political evolution when compared with 
[some European] cases where democracy emerged on 
a step-by-step basis” (Valenzuela 2001, 268). In fact, 
Latin American industrialization was not accompanied 
by the “formation of an industrial working class and 
labour movement,” and hence tended to lack a crucial 
emancipatory force conducive to citizenship (Huber 
1988, 23). In this context, O’Donnell stresses that the 
process of democratization implies achieving “some 
reasonable levels […] of modernization and democrati-
zation of many social —not just political— relations, and 
redefining a role for the state” (O’Donnell 1992, 49).
Despite Tilly’s convincing claim that the progressive 
advance of democracy and citizenship is a function of “the 
maintenance of […] rights” (1995, 5), democratic politics 
has actually had a lesser impact on the development of 
social policy in Latin America than “state expansion,” 
which has played a stronger role, especially during the ISI 
period (Filgueira 2007, 136). Put differently, the mechanics 
of welfare state creation tend to be guided from above 
rather than by participatory elements from below. Yet 
Filgueira’s research findings suggest that due to “the 
relationship between democracy and welfare expansion 
[being] strongly path-dependent,” the contemporary 
democratic nature that predominates in the region 
“might well be the basis for a new push regarding social 
policy efforts” (Filgueira 2007, 137-138).
Before the onset of democratization processes 
throughout the region and prior to popular forces 
intensifying processes of legal innovation in the form 
of influential constitutional courts in some Latin 
American countries during the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the state had often failed “to discipline capital” in 
order for citizens to actually “exercise […] rights” (Tilly 
1995, 13). In contemporary times, the three branches 
of government have been subjected to more profound 
pressure from national as well as international actors 
to shore up the stability and authority of the state.
In more general terms, Brennan argues that “[i]f 
our basic institutions systematically fail to benefit 
innocent people […] then it is unreasonable to ask them 
to observe those institutions” (2012). With respect 
to labour and social regulation, Arthurs cautions 
that “[i]f […] labour law […] is so transformed that it 
no longer advances justice […], it will lack legitimacy 
[and efficiency]” (Arthurs 2011, 29). Policy-makers are 
hence called on to either maintain or strengthen the 
relevance of labour law as an integral part of compre-
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hensive social protection policies with respect to such 
areas as informal employment and the burgeoning 
group of own- account or self-employed workers and 
micro-enterprises.
Furthermore, social policy acts as the transmitter 
between aspiration and implementation in order to 
make social rights accessible to as large a proportion of 
the population as possible, and thus to gradually achieve 
a state of universality. In other words, in the contem-
porary Latin American context, social policy attempts 
to construct “a state-society nexus that is develop-
mental, democratic, and socially inclusive” (Draibe and 
Riesco 2007, 2, italics in original). Whereas informal 
employment is in large part an act of exclusion, social 
policy seeks to create more inclusive social relations 
that make an individual’s life course more predictable 
and secure. Inclusive social and labour market policies 
aimed at the informal sector seek to formalize 
employment as well as businesses, so that a greater 
number of productive units complies with at least a 
minimum level of social and labour regulations.
Advancing the idea of labour regulation in terms of 
“a minimum threshold” is not an endorsement of any 
restrictions placed on informal workers’ claims to 
rights under a country’s labour code (Tokman 2011, 
785). The underlying notion appeals rather to policy-
makers, business associations and unions to become 
more familiar with the realities of Latin American 
labour markets and their “grey areas” (Tokman 2001, 
50) in order to “[improve] informal-sector enterprises’ 
ability to comply, and [to commit] them to follow 
this path” (Tokman 2011, 785). Micro-enterprises are 
especially at risk of generating insufficient profits 
and failing to amass the necessary legal and fiscal 
know-how in order to stem the expenses of regulatory 
compliance. Therefore, policy-makers face the complex 
and electorally unattractive task of advancing along a 
path of incremental regulatory steps with respect to 
micro-enterprises and street vendors. Such regulatory 
advances would have to benefit informal workers 
and enterprises by initially offering the key benefits 
of a formal employment relationship and a legally 
recognized business in exchange for the prospect of 
increased tax receipts for the state in the future.
However, social and labour legislation have all too often 
pursued separate agendas, setting adverse incentives 
that have facilitated socially and fiscally malevolent 
behaviour in the labour market. That also includes the 
threat to formal firms posed by informal economic units, 
since “tax evasion can amount to a large subsidy for low 
productivity firms” (Chong and Pagés 2010, 153). In fact, 
the Colombian labour economist Jaime Tenjo (2012) 
wonders whether a substantial number of participants 
in the informal labour market actually rather prefer 
to maintain their informal status rather than a formal 
employment opportunity. Considering the generally 
low educational levels of informal workers, a key 
reason for their exclusion from the formal employment 
sector, coupled with the subsidies many receive via 
government social assistance programmes, the pursuit 
of such informal activities such as taxi services and 
selling confectionery, beverages or mobile-phone 
minutes on the street may generate a higher standard 
of living than what they can find in the formal labour 
market (Tenjo 2012).
The alternative to rethinking regulation is that the 
state’s protective and fiscal edifice either fails to take 
shape or inevitably crumbles, as rules imposed from 
above do not sufficiently correspond to social realities 
on the ground. Put differently, supported by a suffi-
ciently substantial coalition of societal interest groups, 
regulation has the potential to arrest the decline 
towards corrosive forms of behaviour, and instead 
strengthens the respect for equity-enhancing institu-
tions and the rule of law.
Nevertheless, the regulatory approaches that have 
been formulated to address specific labour market 
challenges have been counterproductive, incoherent 
and inefficient in many cases thus far. Not only does 
this represent a fiscal disaster for governments in the 
region, it also means an uphill battle for those outside 
of the system. Individuals in the informal sector strive 
for a level of labour protection, insurance to soften 
the blows of economic hardship, and the acquisition of 
capabilities with which to exploit their creative talents. 
Analysing the evolution of specific social policies in the 
context of the labour market’s informal sector reveals 
the strong links between holding a formal job with de 
jure access to public social services on the one hand, 
and the funding of significant parts of Latin America’s 
social security systems on the other hand.
Yet the dichotomous structure that allows certain 
citizens disproportionate access to different streams of 
public spending whilst shutting the door to others leaves 
little room for stability and lasting social peace within 
a society. Echoing Filgueira and Filgueira’s taxonomy, 
despite their de jure status as citizens, the outsiders 
must rely on their very own efforts or those of their 
closest kin in a “pre-capitalist” mode of insurance as 
opposed to the blend of state-based and market-based 
insurance available to many of the insiders (Filgueira 
and Filgueira 2002, 128). Over time, socio-economic 
and political inequality feeds pressures that eventually 
surface within today’s predominantly democratic Latin 
American countries. Hence, the state has faced the 
challenge of finding and employing resources in a way 
that provides individuals outside the formal system 
with a level of de facto access to public services such as 
social insurance, legal redress, and education.
There have indeed been advances in recent years in 
terms of coverage and access, especially with respect 
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to the extension of social assistance programmes 
that cut the link between the formal employment 
relationship and access to social insurance. However, 
many so-called complementarities such as corruption 
and clientelism are still rampant in politics, and basic 
needs of housing, infrastructure and personal safety 
have remained disconnected from social citizenship. 
A further corollary is the fact that state budgets need 
to adjust to a new paradigm of higher social spending, 
which requires corresponding revenue increases in 
the long term. The latter is best achieved if a greater 
proportion of the economically active population 
holds formal jobs producing income that can be taxed. 
Striking a balance between the desire to empower as 
well as to protect on the one hand, and the desire to get 
people into productive jobs as well as to let them enjoy 
the fruits of their labour on the other hand, spells out 
the gist of the puzzle. Against this background a policy 
focus on human capabilities is most likely to lead to a 
process of transformation and development.
By and large, most Latin American countries have opted 
for a social protection regime linking employment 
status to social insurance, a relationship that has in 
some cases been operating for almost a century. Thus, 
the system makes access to social insurance contingent 
on the existence of an employment contract, thus 
establishing an unshakeable link between labour and 
social regulation. On a global scale, one finds numerous 
countries that have implemented this system with 
considerable success, as is the case in western Europe, 
although widening cracks have begun to appear on 
the funding and sustainability side even in Europe. 
Nevertheless, in most Latin American countries, 
social insurance financed through payroll tax revenue 
continues to suffer both from high deficits and from 
low coverage and participation, a combination that 
is neither conducive to the generation of formal 
employment nor to financial sustainability of the 
welfare regime.
However, the problem is not only one of ill-devised 
incentive schemes that have evolved over time. Rather, 
“informality is above all an expression of the lack of 
trust in public institutions [and] the limited under-
standing of the benefits derived from social security” 
(Schmid 2009, 38). Conducting longitudinal research in 
the favelas of Rio de Janeiro over the course of almost 
four decades, Perlman claims that favela residents make 
little distinction between jobs in the formal and the 
informal sector as long as they have the chance to “earn 
fair pay for decent work” (2010, 264). The perspective 
of favela residents “is that given the opportunity to 
earn their living, they could solve most of their other 
problems on their own” (Perlman 2010, 264).
There are manifold factors that explain why workers 
might not highly value direct and future eligibility 
for social security coverage, which they earn via their 
co-financing of mandatory non-wage payroll taxes 
over the course of a formal employment relationship 
(Atal and Ñopo 2010, 187). Workers may “assign a [low] 
utility” to the social benefits, as well as fiscal duties that 
a formal employment relationship involves, and may 
instead opt for higher take-home pay due to “liquidity 
constraints; lack of knowledge of the [social insurance] 
systems; myopia; financial illiteracy; limited access to 
benefits; poor programme quality; undesired bundling 
with other social security elements; lack of government 
credibility” (Atal and Ñopo 2010, 187-188).
In a nutshell, trust in social insurance and in the 
benefits of participation seem almost as important as 
the existence of the system itself. What is more, laws 
that do not bring about substantial change will not 
deliver the trust that is needed in order to formalize, 
increase revenues via taxes, educate and invest. Roberts 
advances a similar argument by stating that, even 
though the process of formalization does not by its 
own nature result in enhanced “services and effective 
coverage, […] it does mean a deepening of citizen-state 
relations” (Roberts 2005, 153).
The above discussion indicates the gap between 
aspiration as expressed in legislation and political 
rhetoric on one side, and the way most Latin Americans 
experience socio-economic reality —or the “distance 
between norms and facts in labour market institu-
tions”— on the other side (Bensusán 2006, 115, my 
translation). According to García and Rodríguez, the 
“gap between the written law and reality does not seem 
[…] to be a dysfunction or a failure […] but rather [law’s] 
characteristic element” (2003, 30). The complexities 
of informal employment are very much an expression 
of this dichotomy. Thus, paradoxically, we witness the 
“expansion of informal activities in a largely regulated 
context” (Castells and Portes 1989, 13).
The Purpose of Social Protection
Social protection as a tool of social policy-making acts 
as an anti-poverty measure, pools risk across society, 
and deals with issues of individual myopia in terms 
of insuring against risks. The motivation for social 
protection originates from social rights discourse and 
the contested notion of citizenship. Seen through the 
conceptual lens of Amartya Sen’s capability approach, 
the combination of social protection and labour law 
establishes “institutional mechanisms [extending] the 
substantive freedom of action of individuals” (Deakin 
and Koukiadaki 2011, 6). What is more, regulatory 
policy-making motivated by social rights discourse 
does not stop at providing “formal access to the institu-
tions of property and contract,” but also seeks to fulfil 
a “market-creating function” to provide incentives and 
equip citizens to “participate in the labour market” 
(Deakin 2005, 4, italics in original).
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Labour regulation is chiefly concerned with the issue of 
freedom of association, the prohibition of child labour, 
safety provisions, minimum wage policies, overtime 
and vacation legislation, as well as “maternity-related 
leave” (Cox 1997, 129). Labour law regulates individual 
and collective aspects of the employment relationship 
and industrial relations. Those regulatory devices 
have generally been extended to cover the issues of 
generating employment and providing vocational 
training (Cox 1997, 129). According to Hausmann, 
traditional social policy vis-à-vis the regulation of labour 
includes three additional components: “public provision 
of health and education services; […] publicly provided 
social security; interventions in the price mechanism 
through controls and […] subsidies” (1994, 173).
Basic social security acts as an inclusive measure “making 
the outcomes of economic forces more equitable 
[enhancing] peace, stability and social cohesion” (ILO 
2008, 2). In order to facilitate the management of an 
individual’s life risks and to contribute to lowering the 
poverty rate, “[g]overnments make transfers to house-
holds, either in cash or in kind” (Ferreira and Robalino 
2011, 836). Life risks such as an individual’s health, 
longevity, and income are to a considerable extent 
dependent on employment status.
Regular occurrences of market imperfections, moral 
hazard, imperfect information, and adverse selection 
that cause instances of market failure, suggest a need 
for government intervention in order to provide a 
mechanism to cushion the impact of risks by spreading 
uncertainties across society rather than concentrating 
societal burden on a specific sector (Akerlof 1970, 488; 
Arrow 1963, 967; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, 648). Purely 
private systems of health or unemployment insurance, 
for instance, would only admit relatively healthy 
individuals or those with relatively high degrees of skills 
or job security, so that the resulting costs must be shoul-
dered by either the state or the “vulnerable worker,” 
disregarding considerations of “cost effectiveness as 
well as social cohesion” (Deakin 2011, 164-165).
In fact, Samuelson (1958, 481-482) analysed social 
insurance from the point of view of a social contract 
between the different generations of society and the 
state “as a complicated device for self- or reinsurance,” 
so that the system allows for efficient and reliable 
inter-generational burden-sharing. Of course, such a 
complex social insurance scheme not only invokes “Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative [enjoining like people to follow 
the common pattern that benefits the most],” but also 
stresses “money as a medium of exchange” (Samuelson 
1958, 480-481). Stable money as a key motivational factor 
to buy into state-orchestrated social insurance has only 
recently become a hallmark of at least the major Latin 
American economies, as a degree of permissiveness 
towards inflation has undermined the state’s legitimacy 
and its capacity throughout the region’s history.
On an elementary level, social protection is motivated by 
equity concerns and risk pooling “from localistic micro-
solidarities to societal institutions such as trade unions, 
insurance companies, or the welfare state” as societies 
undergo processes of modernization (Esping-Andersen 
1999, 48). Industrialization increased the demand for wage 
labour, and in the context of an industrialized economy 
the existence of social security can provide an incentive to 
workers to seek employment in the formal labour market 
(Deakin 2011, 165). However, Deakin’s argument needs to 
be scrutinized because an economy has to create labour 
demand and thus offer formal employment in the first 
place in order for a worker to participate in social security. 
Moreover, contemporary social policy can no longer rely 
on the relative safety provided by the nuclear family 
and the idea of the male breadwinner. Similarly, policy-
makers have to take into account socio-economic shocks 
like the forced displacement of a country’s population, as 
in the case of Colombia.
A further rationale for social security is based on the 
need to counteract the negative ramifications of such 
human personality traits as myopia, implying that 
“agents [discount] near dates much less than distant 
dates and [end] up saving too little” (Andersen and 
Bhattacharya 2011, 157). Individuals with little access 
to information and education particularly tend to be 
worse affected by myopia, as they are subsequently less 
likely to be able to act on future financial concerns such 
as old-age pensions and health insurance. Therefore, 
governments have built up bureaucratic and adminis-
trative capacities in order to put in place a system of 
mandatory contributions and savings.
Domestic workers tend to have low levels of education, 
inadequate knowledge both of social security and the 
legal system, as well as low job security since they can 
easily be substituted. These workers often require 
the support of benevolent employers and Bureaus of 
Citizen Advice in order to fully grasp the importance 
of regularly funding their public pension accounts. 
Of course, an additional explanatory factor for the 
relative passivity of domestic workers is the fact that 
the poor in Latin America generally have a low opinion 
of government schemes that purport to provide them 
with security. Moreover, with lower-than-average life 
expectancy, the poor find it difficult to value a pension 
that would only be paid out to them once they reach 
the age of sixty or older, depending on the individual 
country’s legislation (James 1999, 13).
Governments have devised social protection systems with 
two protective components. The state centralizes income 
streams via its monopoly on taxation and redistributes 
resources according to shifting patterns of spending 
priorities, which are informed by the competitive forces 
of politics. It is difficult to draw a clear conceptual line 
between the two elements of social protection, namely 
social insurance and social assistance (Ferreira and 
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Robalino 2011, 837). However, on a fundamental level 
social insurance is “intended for consumption smoothing 
and [social assistance] for redistribution in permanent 
incomes” (Ferreira and Robalino 2011, 837).
Social insurance tends to be financed via contributory 
schemes, i.e. payroll taxes that are co-financed by the 
employer and the employee in a formal employment 
relationship. Social assistance is paid for out of the 
non-contributory components of the national budget, 
i.e. consumption taxes or royalty income, and, impor-
tantly, income from formal labour market participants’ 
payroll taxes or non-wage labour costs.
Crucially for the informal sector debate, due to the 
relatively low number of participants in the contributory 
scheme, social assistance has taken on a markedly higher 
degree of importance as an anti-poverty measure in most 
Latin American countries over the past decade. Most social 
assistance programmes thus focus on “in-kind transfers 
(particularly food programmes); workfare programmes; 
non-contributory social insurance schemes (such as social 
pensions); and conditional cash transfers (CCTs)” (Ferreira 
and Robalino 2011, 838). Social assistance has thus been 
devised in order to protect those citizens who do not 
contribute to social insurance via their co-payments of 
non-wage labour costs.
This situation tends to arise because of “either legal 
avoidance (primarily through self-employment) or 
illegal evasion” (Atal and Ñopo 2010, 185). In fact, a 
majority of households do not have a “family member 
in the labour market who receives protection against 
risks,” so that, depending on an individual country’s 
social and labour regulation and policy, there potentially 
exists a significant danger of downward social mobility 
if an individual falls sick, becomes unemployed, or 
reaches old age (Atal and Ñopo 2010, 185). However, 
advances in social assistance have sought to create a 
mitigating buffer in so far as the social protective system 
nowadays provides access to basic social healthcare, 
for instance, independent of the employment status of 
the head of household, at least in urban areas.
Indeed, the current structure of social protection can 
act as a disincentive to seek formal employment. Based 
on an individual’s calculations, he might be better off 
earning a wage in an informal job whilst at the same 
time taking advantage of elements of social assistance 
programmes, which would normally be denied to him 
if he were in a formal employment relationship. In fact, 
“[c]onditioning welfare transfers on the labour-market 
status of the potential beneficiaries will increase the 
level of informality of the economy” (Galiani and 
Weinschelbaum 2012, 837). Maloney observes that “[o]
ften an entire family is covered by medical benefits 
when any one member is formally employed, so the 
marginal value of benefits to the second formal sector 
worker is zero” (2003, 72).
Thus, according to institutionalist regulatory parlance, 
such social “[i]nstitutions [as social protection] reduce 
uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life” 
(North 1990, 3). Nevertheless, apart from structuring 
human interactions in socially beneficial ways, insti-
tutions can also perpetuate suboptimal social orders, 
constantly challenging the historical and contemporary 
configuration of social protection and labour law in the 
economic development of Latin America.
The Social Policy Perspective on Informal 
Employment
This section stresses the renewed impetus that Latin 
American countries have given to social policy in the 
sense that it also inevitably includes labour legislation 
—the workplace being a locus of exploitation— but also 
of social mobility, of course. Indeed, the protective 
institution of social insurance tends to be delivered 
and administered via the formal labour market (Levy 
2008). The term ‘social policy’ is here “understood as 
any actions by which the state intends to provide direct 
assistance to individuals to raise their living standards.” 
The state can provide indirect assistance by means of 
“monetary [and] trade policy,” for example (Atal and 
Ñopo 2010, 184, my italics).
The complex issues that informality raises in terms 
of insufficient coverage of social protection have also 
featured more prominently in Latin American policy 
debates in recent years (Levy 2008). Moreover, there 
exists a two-way relationship between informality and 
social policy; i.e. the current design of social protection 
to some degree provides an incentive to informal 
activities in the labour market, whilst social protection 
as a part of social policy has frequently failed to cover 
individuals who, due to their informal employment 
status, do not fully participate in the system of social 
protection that is currently in place in Latin America.
Murillo Ronconi and Schrank state that under current 
conditions “labour-market based systems of social 
protection […] pool risks at the level of the enterprise 
rather than the economy, and thereby elevate labour 
costs, undercut redistribution, and give firms and 
workers an incentive to enter the informal economy” 
(2011, 809). The policy of funding social insurance via 
the contributions of the relatively small number of 
formal labour market participants, in conjunction with 
commonplace evasion of social and “labour regulations 
and individuals’ low valuation of social [insurance] 
benefits” provides incentives to entrepreneurs and 
employees to “remain uncovered in order to avoid 
contributions” (Atal and Ñopo 2010, 203). Consequently, 
that socially suboptimal path adds to the pressure on 
the social protective regime, which then not only has 
to provide resources for the coverage of children, the 
sick and the elderly, but also for those “not covered 
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by the formal mechanisms” (Atal and Ñopo 2010, 203; 
Vuletin 2008, 12). In other words, the current funding 
mechanism of social protection measures runs counter 
to the principle of equitable burden sharing in society 
(Levy 2008).
Furthermore, only if a country manages to sustainably 
control the level of unemployment are there sufficient 
revenue and budgetary resources for social services. 
Conversely, employment creation in productive parts 
of the economy is a political and economic imperative, 
which governments around the world have found hard 
to implement. In fact, since the labour market functions 
as a “social integration axis […] social protection 
strategies based on universal rights do not override the 
purpose of creating more and better jobs” (Bertranou 
and Maurizio 2010, 27).
What is more, the conceptual framework of this paper 
does not adopt an analytical focus on employment 
contracts, which Langille regards as “a very thin 
and negative foundation for labour law” (2011, 36). 
Therefore, issues such as the analysis of disputes 
between individual employees and their employers, as 
well as changes to the system of severance payments 
and dismissal legislation, are not discussed in detail. 
Furthermore, individual labour law has little bearing 
on labour market and social protection institutions in 
the presence of high numbers of informal workers and 
self-employed individuals on the one hand, and low 
coverage rates of labour contracts, especially in the 
agriculture, construction and trade sectors, on the other 
hand. Thinking beyond the confines of this article, an 
examination of employment contracts would, however, 
be relevant as part of an extensive analysis of informal 
employment because of the inextricable links between 
approaches to creating formal employment and the 
fiercely debated themes of deregulation and flexibility 
of labour markets.
Nevertheless, the analytical perspective employed 
in this research has been guided by social rights 
discourse, which pursues “a thicker and more positive 
claim” (Langille 2011, 36). Applied to the study of 
regulatory approaches to informal employment, only a 
conceptual lens that contextualizes the nexus between 
law, socio-economic structures and political forces can 
be expected to yield a promising analysis. By stressing 
the essential human and social nature of work, we can 
more convincingly claim to be wresting the debate 
on informal employment from the hands of some 
members of the economics and legal professions who 
all too often tend to be concerned with dichotomies 
such as regulation versus deregulation, flexibility 
versus rigidity, and the minutiae of contract details 
and court procedures, even though work as a human 
activity touches on the personal, socio-economic, legal, 
political and cultural domains.
Political actors and analysts have repeatedly criticized 
the institution of labour law as a stumbling block on the 
road towards economic development and as ineffective 
in protecting “vulnerable workers” (Davidov and Langille 
2011, 1). Given the pressing questions raised by informal 
employment, “[l]abour law faces the challenge of how 
[to] integrate diversity [and] status issues such as that of 
precarious workers,” how —as part of a comprehensive 
social policy approach—labour law can “[protect] the 
vulnerable,” and in what ways labour law “[relates] to 
the increasing complexity” of industrial and societal 
modernization (López, Chacartegui and Cantón 2011, 346).
Moreover, this paper stresses the relevance of the 
currently operational funding mechanism of the social 
security system and its claim to universal coverage 
as a framing mechanism to analyse social and labour 
regulation. The factors of participation in the formal 
labour market, sustainability of the contributory 
system, coverage of social protection, and inclusive 
policies for the informal sector form the inextricable 
nexus between labour and social legislation. In fact, 
the interplay and closer integration of labour law and 
social protection create opportunities “for the future 
relevance of labour law” (Sankaran 2011, 233, my italics) 
and for the “development functions of labour law” 
(Deakin 2011, 164).
Conclusion
The fact that under current conditions many Latin 
Americans are forced or incentivized to labour at 
least to some extent outside the law has dire conse-
quences for their very own livelihoods, as well as for 
social cohesion within societies, the sustainability of 
social protection, and the trust placed in the protective 
elements of labour law. Nevertheless, several years 
after a consensus on the need for publicly-funded social 
protection emerged via fierce political contestation, a 
considerable number of individuals in the region are 
still not able to find decent work or to receive insurance 
against personal life risks and “Black Swan” events in 
the wider economy.
Moreover, the regulatory framework in many respects 
undermines an individual’s abilities to engage in entre-
preneurship that makes ample as well as productive 
use of a country’s human and natural resources. In 
other words, the substantive policy goals of social and 
labour regulation are most likely met by enhancing 
capabilities and by empowering individuals to utilize 
those capabilities. In particular, the continued presence 
of structural, i.e. non-temporary occurrences of 
unemployment, often makes state intervention in the 
form of empowering social policy, protective labour 
legislation, and public spending a crucial matter for 
maintaining social peace and providing a minimum 
level of domestic demand.
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Although advances have been made in social policies 
since the 1990s, employment creation in terms of 
quality rather than quantity still lags behind most other 
economic indicators, and labour law hence has limited 
applicability. Notwithstanding this fact, the legal codes 
of the Latin American countries studied here still 
maintain some relevance today, although they have 
certainly not fulfilled the hopes that have been invested 
in labour law throughout history.
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